Phenomenology Hegel is following Aristotle's treatment of friendship in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics (PhM 465). It is clearly Aristotle's view that friendship or love is what holds the polis together. In fact, friendship is more important than justice in this respect, since friends treat each other better than justice would demand and it would be far worse to harm a friend than someone else. [25] I want to be quite clear, then, that I do not ignore love or dismiss it. In fact, I agree with commentators like Williams and Westphal about the importance and centrality of love for Hegel's thought. On the other hand, though, I am not convince that love will give us the equality that these commentators seem to think it will. According to Williams, "Love seeks a union with its other, in which domination and subordination are out of place. Love allows the other to be, i.e., it seeks the freedom of the other." [26] While love is quite compatible with equality, as between brother and sister, love certainly does not require equality. Love is perfectly compatible with inequality. Let me be as clear about this as possible -so as not to be misunderstood. I certainly think that in a relationship between a man and a woman equality is desirable. I also think that the relationship will be a better relationship if it is one of equality. I also think that love is a valuable and desirable thing. But I simply do not think that there is anything about love which demands, requires, or necessarily works for equality in a relationship. I do not think that love and equality are necessarily related. I think it desirable that a loving relationship also be one of equality, but just as a relationship of equality need not involve love, so we can perfectly well have love without having equality. To think that love and equality necessarily or normally go together is to romanticize love-to expect something of it which it is not. We can easily love someone we consider our inferior or our superior-God, our dog, the King or the Queen, our children, our parents. For centuries, men have been loving their wives while thinking them their inferiors-and I have no reason to believe that many of these men did not really love their wives-certainly not because there is any incompatibility between love and inequality. Certainly those relationships would have been improved by equality; but I see no reason to think that the love as love would necessarily have been deepened or made truer. Love and equality are just different things. There is nothing about loving someone that one considers an inferior that necessarily distorts the love. Love can be perfectly true love when it is love of an equal, a superior, or an inferior. Certainly, Aristotle did not think that love implied equality when he claimed that it was what held the city together.
Friendship, on the other hand, is a bit different. It does not require complete and perfect equality. It is possible to be friends with someone from a very different social class or economic level, or with someone with a very different level of intelligence or athletic ability. But these inequalities will rub against the friendship. For the friendship to succeed, the friends will at least have to carve out an area in which they can relate to each other with relative equality. A poor person is not likely to feel comfortable spending a lot of time at their rich friend's country club and may well be harmed by the experience; so also the wealthy person will likely find it difficult hanging out in the inner city. On the other hand, the two could carve out an area of equality and become very close friends at the university, in the army, on a sports team, on the job, or perhaps even when engaged in the activities of citizenship in a community.
Aristotle also thinks economic inequality will erode friendship.[27] Friendship, then, differs from love.
Love does not require equality. We can perfectly well love someone without considering them our equal socially, politically, economically, intellectually, athletically, or in a host of other ways. On the other hand, husband and wife, besides being in love, could also be friends. If so, they too would have to carve out an area of equality, and thus friendship could be a force for equality in their relationship. But they need not be friends. They could simply be in love, and I think it is relatively easy to love someone that is in no way considered an equal and it is not necessary to carve out an area of equality around which to build the relationship. It is certainly not necessary in loving children. And in the past men have had no difficulty in loving women they in no way considered their equals. In fact, such inequality often works to endear women to men. This can obviously become quite demeaning and thus it is very important to build equality into such relationships. It is just not the case, however, that there is anything about love that pushes for such equality. The equality has to be brought in from outside the love.
The question, then, is whether Hegel recognizes that love does not require equality. I think he clearly does recognize this in the Phenomenology. It is only the relationship of brother and sister that is a relationship of equality. The relationship of husband to wife, which is obviously a relationship of love, is not one of equality. In an earlier text, the System of Ethical Life, Hegel explicitly held that the husband was the master.
[28] Hegel does not actually make this claim in the Phenomenology. He does say, however, that the son is "lord and master of the mother who bore him…" (PhG 288/258-9). If that is so, it would be hard to imagine that Hegel would not also take the husband to be lord and master of his wife.
In the System of Ethical Life, Hegel also makes a much more direct and explicit connection between the relationship of lordship and bondage and the relationship between the sexes in love, marriage, and property. They are all treated within a span of 30 pages as part of a complex developmental sequence.
[29] Indeed, Hegel says outright: "the lordship and bondage relation…while this relation is only something qua apparent and external, is the [patriarchal] family." [30] In the Phenomenology, the masterslave dialectic is separated by more than 200 pages from the section on the Ethical Order where relations between the sexes, love, family, and property are discussed. Nevertheless, we must notice the of the PhG, which, generally speaking, should not be surprising. Nevertheless, the master-slave dialectic is a general model that gets played out again and again in Hegel's thought. And each time we should expect to see significant differences despite the fact that we have the same core model. I hope to show in what follows to what extent this model fits Antigone. See also note 32 below.
[4] Oliver, p. 70.
[5] Socrates, of course, lives in a society permeated by Sittlichkeit and his own ethical thought is by no means free of it. Nevertheless, we find the clear beginnings of Moralität in his willingness to make individual philosophical rationality the ultimate authority in all matters. He is even willing to call all custom and tradition, even the mythical authority of the gods, before the court of philosophical reason and to criticize and reject whatever is found wanting. 
